Forms of Moral Relativism
Normative moral relativism and moral judgment relativism are two distinct forms of moral relativism that have been discussed in philosophical discourse. This article aims to examine and differentiate these two forms, drawing from various scholarly sources such as “WHAT IS MORAL” by Gilbert Harman (HARWIM-4.1.pdf), the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entry on “Moral Relativism,” and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entry on “Moral Relativism.”
Normative Moral Relativism
Normative moral relativism asserts that different individuals or cultures can be subject to different moral demands without being subject to a more basic demand that accounts for this difference in situations. In other words, normative moral relativism posits that moral obligations are context-dependent and vary across different cultural or individual perspectives.
According to Gilbert Harman’s work, normative moral relativism suggests that moral principles and obligations are not universally binding but rather contingent upon cultural or individual norms and values. This view implies that what is considered morally right or wrong can differ from one cultural context to another. Normative moral relativism challenges the idea of objective moral truths and argues that moral judgments should be evaluated within their specific cultural or individual framework.
Moral Judgment Relativism
Moral judgment relativism, as discussed in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entry on “Moral Relativism,” posits that moral judgments are true or false only relative to a particular standpoint, such as a culture or historical period. This form of relativism denies the existence of a uniquely privileged standpoint and emphasizes the diversity of moral values across different cultures.
According to this perspective, moral judgments cannot be universally true or false because they are shaped by the specific cultural, historical, and social contexts in which they arise. Moral judgment relativism recognizes that different cultures often exhibit radically different moral values and norms. It challenges the notion of a single, objective moral standard and highlights the subjective nature of moral judgments.
In conclusion, normative moral relativism and moral judgment relativism are two forms of moral relativism that have been explored in philosophical discourse. Normative moral relativism suggests that moral obligations are context-dependent and can vary across different cultures or individuals. On the other hand, moral judgment relativism asserts that moral judgments are true or false only relative to a particular standpoint, such as a culture or historical period. These forms of relativism challenge the notion of objective moral truths and emphasize the diversity of moral values across different perspectives.
FAQs
What is normative moral relativism?
Normative moral relativism asserts that different individuals or cultures can be subject to different moral demands without being subject to a more basic demand that accounts for this difference in situations. It suggests that moral obligations are context-dependent and vary across different cultural or individual perspectives.
What is moral judgment relativism?
Moral judgment relativism states that moral judgments are true or false only relative to a particular standpoint, such as a culture or historical period. It denies the existence of a uniquely privileged standpoint and argues that different cultures often exhibit radically different moral values.
How does normative moral relativism differ from moral judgment relativism?
Normative moral relativism focuses on the context-dependency of moral obligations and the variations across different cultural or individual perspectives. It emphasizes that moral demands can differ without being subject to a more basic demand that accounts for the difference in situations.
Moral judgment relativism, on the other hand, emphasizes the relativity of moral judgments to specific standpoints and rejects the idea of a uniquely privileged standpoint. It highlights the diversity of moral values across different cultures and historical periods.
Are normative moral relativism and moral judgment relativism compatible?
Normative moral relativism and moral judgment relativism are distinct forms of moral relativism, addressing different aspects of moral reasoning. While they share the overarching idea of relativism, they focus on different dimensions of moral evaluations.
Normative moral relativism deals with the variation of moral demands across different cultural or individual perspectives, whereas moral judgment relativism concerns the relativity of moral judgments to specific standpoints. Both forms challenge the notion of objective moral truths but approach relativism from different angles.
Can normative moral relativism and moral judgment relativism coexist?
Normative moral relativism and moral judgment relativism can coexist as they address different aspects of moral relativism. Normative moral relativism focuses on the context-dependency of moral obligations, while moral judgment relativism emphasizes the relativity of moral judgments to specific standpoints.
These forms of relativism can be seen as complementary perspectives that contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the complex nature of moral relativism. However, it is important to note that the compatibility of these forms may vary depending on specific philosophical frameworks and interpretations.
Are there other forms of moral relativism?
While normative moral relativism and moral judgment relativism are two prominent forms of moral relativism, there are other variations and perspectives within the realm of moral relativism. These include descriptive relativism, cultural relativism, ethical non-realism, ethical non-cognitivism, and meta-ethical relativism.
Each of these forms explores different dimensions of moral relativism, offering distinct perspectives on the nature of moral judgments and the relativity of moral values across cultures, individuals, or historical periods.